Authors and CAN EECCA network members – Kokorin A. O., Mogilyuk S.V.
The 30th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 30) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Paris Agreement was held in Belem, Brazil between 10th-22nd of November 2025. Unlike the two earlier COPs, which had clearly defined main goals (the COP’s adaptation goal and the financial goal for 2035), the meeting in Belém focused on comparatively smaller issues and a wide range of routine matters for the UNFCCC. The financial target adopted a year ago signifies the gradual financial globalization of the Paris Agreement. Unlike the financial commitment of the Global North to the Global South adopted in Paris, the new target consists of two “nested” parts. The part of North-South should be “at least US$300 billion per year by 2035” and included in the total amount provided to developing countries for “at least 11.3 trillion US dollars per year by 2035”[1]. Report on “Baku to Belem Roadmap to 1.3T» was presented in Belem. It was prepared by the experts in fall of 2025 under the leadership of the President of COP30. It contains some interesting suggestions. In particular the report suggests 100 largest companies and 100 leading financial institutions to report on how they facilitate NDCs (national determined contributions) and National Adaptation Plans implementation by the countries. In the COP Draft Decision (Global Mutirão: Uniting humanity in a global mobilization against climate change) the report is “taken into consideration” but no practical steps outlined.
In the first year of the new phase of the Paris Agreement, the growing financial role of the South could not yet be the primary factor in the COP. Therefore, the priority of the current conference was largely determined by its location. The Amazon region is very much in need of measures to adapt to climate change, protect forests from reckless commercial exploitation, and assist local communities whose lives are negatively affected by the transition to low-carbon development, among other things. It is no coincidence that one of the main slogans of civil society at COP30 was “Adaptation is not a business!”. There was also a ‘reverse’ factor — the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the termination of USAID, and the growth of “skepticism” and criticism of climate science.
In this context it is fair to say that the fundamental outcome of the COP30 is the confirmation of global progress and growing trust in science. Of course, the world is not going towards global warming limits as outlined in Paris Agreement. However, at it is noted in the СОР30 Draft Decision, there is a change in the expectation since 20-25 years ago, when the trajectory of greenhouse emissions was expected to cause 4ºС of warming, while current projections vary within 2,3-2,5ºС. Many people have doubts about this range. Considering additional effects, in particular the melting of permafrost, it is probably more accurate to say 3ºC. Nevertheless, progress has been made, and it is considerable.
It is recommended that countries in our region[2], where there is much talk about the failure of global efforts, emphasize in the media and in speeches by all individuals and at all levels that an important outcome of COP30 is the confirmation of global progress and trust in science, and that COP30 has fulfilled its modest ‘plan’, albeit far from perfectly.
It is critically important that countries’ 2035 targets—with all Parties required to submit their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in 2025—together with further actions, particularly by the largest emitters such as China and the European Union, and statements by representatives of global business, have clearly demonstrated that the world is seriously committed to achieving carbon neutrality in the last quarter of the century. Companies and foundations, cities and a wide range of organizations, especially non-governmental organizations, have demonstrated tangible progress in low-carbon development and adaptation to climate change. New working relationships and partnerships have been established, existing ones have been strengthened, and the foundations have been laid for new projects and joint actions across a broad range of thematic areas and activities. Civil society, in particular Indigenous Peoples and the Climate Action Network (CAN), has played a highly active role. Their sustained engagement and pressure—both through the media and directly, notably on the European Union and the United Kingdom regarding the establishment of a new mechanism for a just transition—have contributed significantly to the overall success.
The development of the Just Transition (JT) mechanism was the main domain of CAN’s position. The ongoing discussions started from the very moment of the development of UAE Just Transition Working Program (UAE JTWP) at COP 28, have lasted for about 2 years, but have not resulted in any practical solutions. There were various options for further development: an information base, a technical assistance network, dialogue, but all of them are much weaker than the mechanism[3]. Only a mechanism with strong institutional and financial functions can genuinely support local communities and vulnerable groups in addressing the challenges arising during the ‘transition’—the shift in global and national efforts toward low-carbon development and climate change adaptation. Prior to COP, this initiative was referred to as the Belém Action Mechanism on Just Transition (BAM). The difficulties of miners caused by declines in the demand for coal are a clear example of such challenges. However, the challenge extends far beyond the coal sector and affects agriculture, where increasing water scarcity is forcing changes to long-established ways of life.
No doubt, this applies to all countries, economic sectors, and population groups, as stated in the СОР30 Draft Decision on JT. However, COP30 primarily discussed assistance to vulnerable developing countries in addressing “transition” issues, with finance being the main “bone of contention” (as in virtually all matters related to the UNFCCC). Developing countries insisted on BAM, a mechanism for JT, and were actively supported by civil society. Developed countries, primarily the EU, Canada, and the UK, were opposed, as they did not want to create another track that would require funding. The US did not participate in the negotiations, but clearly, they would have been strongly opposed. As a result, a compromise decision was reached. The mechanism has not been formally established, but it needs to be developed so that a decision on its operationalization can be made at COP31. It is no longer a question of creation, which is practically a foregone conclusion, but of the details of its operation. In June 2026, at the 64th session of the Subsidiary Bodies (SB) of the UNFCCC, recommendations should be prepared — options for COP31 decisions. Countries and organizations are invited to submit their statements of views by March 15, 2026.
The COP30 Draft Decisions on JT also had many positive things to say about the development of renewable energy sources and low-carbon technologies, about modern energy (African countries insisted on a separate entry about clean cooking — preparing food in a modern way, without harming health and ecosystems), the importance of adaptation, and special attention to indigenous peoples, women, and other vulnerable groups. The importance of increasing grants and concessional loans is noted, and the need to reduce the credit burden has not been forgotten. However, this has not yet been linked to practical action. This is what the future will look like: rapid progress in the UNFCCC is unlikely, but very considerable step forward has been surely taken. There is every reason to expect that the next step will be taken at COP31, and things will move forward.
There will be many challenges linked to Just Transition in the countries of the region, particularly at the nexus of climate, water, agriculture, and energy. Some of these challenges are already becoming evident. Early identification of such challenges is essential to enable their effective consideration within the new mechanism and to ensure alignment with ongoing international processes and efforts.
Adaptation issues. In general, adaptation was one of the main topics in the focus of COP30. This time it was necessary to specify the implementation of the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) adopted at СОР28. Seven priority themes were identified (water scarcity, food and agriculture, health, ecosystems and biodiversity, human infrastructure, poverty eradication, cultural heritage) and four phases of action (impact and risk assessment, planning, implementation, monitoring). In 2025, a group of more than 70 experts formulated 100 indicators for all 11 of the above themes and phases based on approximately 1,500 proposals received (see: the report and Excel spreadsheet with the list of indicators and their detailed description). It was expected that countries would endorse it relatively fast, but it was not the case.
Several developing countries, in particular least developed countries and African countries, emphasized that the allocation of adequate financial resources for adaptation—proposing at least a tripling of adaptation finance by 2030—should be a precondition for consideration of the indicators. The African Group proposed postponing the consideration of the indicators for two years, until COP32, to be hosted in Africa. This position was supported in principle by the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC) group, comprising 23 developing countries, including China, India, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Malaysia, which proposed postponing consideration of the indicators for one year. In addition, several developing countries expressed concerns regarding the applicability of indicators to the implementation phase of projects related to finance, particularly with respect to requirements for the disclosure of information by countries receiving international support. Developed countries, Latin American countries, and least developed countries called for the early consideration and approval of the indicators. At the same time, the European Union and other developed countries opposed the inclusion of quantitative parameters related to increases in adaptation finance.
After intense negotiations, the countries reached a decision. On the last day of COP30, they formulated a clause on financial growth, having previously agreed on 59 indicators (see СОР3 Draft Decision on GGA). Many indicators that could characterize the actions of the country as a whole, rather than just a specific adaptation project, were removed. For example, how much the total area of natural ecosystems covered by adaptation measures is being changed. Financial indicators now only describe support from developed countries and the needs of developing countries, rather than their own expenditures. In particular, infrastructure parameters of people’s lives were reduced — only two of the seven proposed indicators remained, and direct references to countries’ goals (NDCs) and national adaptation plans were removed. The wording of many indicators was “simplified,” allowing countries to interpret them themselves. All indices of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) were removed. Thus, countries can assess the vulnerability and status of species and ecosystems independently, without necessarily following international approaches. As a result, the contribution to the synergy of the Rio conventions turned out to be much less than expected.
The resulting system of indicators was harshly criticized by some countries and civil society. It was pointed out that the final information was incomplete and that there were “loopholes” — opportunities for ambiguous use of the indicators at one’s own discretion. In response to the criticism, the Decision refers to technical refinement of the indicators, including their detailing, as well as a two-year program (Belém–Addis vision on adaptation) to prepare guidelines for their practical application. The Secretariat is to prepare a report for the next COP on the use of indicators, their synergies, gaps and ways to fill them, and an analysis of relevant guidelines, tools and methodologies. Of course, the report and program will not replace an official decision, but they will probably add clarity and provide recommendations that countries, organizations and financial institutions will use as a guide.
It is important for our region to correlate existing and planned adaptation projects with this system of indicators. There is no need to wait for them to become ‘perfectly clear’, as this may never happen. It is better to interpret the indicators as they apply to our region, where there are enough specialists to do so. For example, for species and ecosystems, choose to use IUCN indices, which will promote synergy between the Rio conventions and attract international funding.
In terms of the increase of finance the Draft Decision and the Decision on GGA have calls for efforts and the increase of adaptation funding in developing countries. The urge is to have at least triple growth by 2035. Developed countries are urged to strengthen their trajectory of collective financial support for adaptation in developing countries. This is understood to be in addition to the previously planned doubling of developed countries’ adaptation funding for developing countries (by 2025 from 2019 levels, from approximately $20 billion to $40 billion per year). In addition to UNEP Adaptation Gap Report 2025 issued prior to COP 30 the developed countries have allocated about 27 billion a year for adaptation in developing countries in 2022-2023. Approximately 7 more billion a year were provided by the states not included to Annex 1 of the UNFCCC.
Despite the shortcomings of the GGA decisions, they represent a step forward. A practical tool has been adopted—a system of indicators for “measuring” adaptation projects and assessing their relevance and effectiveness. While far from perfect, when applied correctly this system can enhance project effectiveness, strengthen the long-term sustainability of results, and help mobilize increased funding for adaptation efforts in developing countries.
Market and non-market approaches to international cooperation (Article 6 of the Paris Agreement) were not at the center of official negotiations, as only technical decisions were adopted. Under Article 6.2, discussions focused primarily on the organization of the work of expert groups reviewing information submitted by Parties on the transfer and acquisition of carbon units. Under Article 6.4, attention was given to the activities of the Supervisory Body, to which full authority over the mechanism has been fully delegated, as confirmed by the decision adopted. Article 6.8 addressed the relevant work program and further improvement of the platform for cooperative action among countries without the transfer of carbon units.
At the same time, carbon markets were actively discussed beyond official negotiations, at informal events. The conclusion was that “only units of the highest quality (baseline, additionality, socio-environmental factors) will find buyers”. Airlines were named as the main buyers for the coming year, as they will have to pay in units or money for GHG emissions exceeding a certain level from 2027 onwards. High demand and a shortage of high-quality units eligible under the ICAO CORSIA (Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation) system are expected. The first purchases have been announced, in particular by Japanese companies. In the medium term, bilateral agreements on measures like the EU’s CBAM, as well as the requirements of the International Maritime Organization, which is following in the footsteps of the ICAO, may become a driver. In the future, we expect to see gradual recognition of foreign units and their purchase to meet the obligations of companies and organizations in their own countries (in the 2030s, Japan ~300 MtCO2-eq/year, EU ~150 MtCO2-eq/year, Singapore, Switzerland, UAE, China). Overall, approximately 1-2% of global emissions in the 2030s, possibly up to 10% in the 2050s.
In countries in our region, it makes sense to create conditions for the ‘generation’ of a small number of high-quality units. To follow the principle of additionality, it is advisable to specify in the NDCs which technologies or actions are likely to be the most expensive and far from cost-effective, will be beyond the reach of national goals, and that the national legislative framework does not require their development. The positive socio-environmental impacts of the project should not be overlooked, as without them, the high quality of the units is unlikely to be recognized. It is advisable to register pilot projects that meet the strict requirements of international systems. For example, in the recognized CORSIA Verified Carbon Standard, Gold Standard, or the new Global Carbon Council. This will not contradict their registration under Article 6.4. When the A6.4 Mechanism Registry will be launched in its full capacity and the unit transaction analysis will be performed, it will make sense to design new ‘generation’ projects using the foundation of best practices. All this, of course, does not contradict the establishment and operation of ‘softer’ internal national systems for the circulation of units, which are not required to enter the market under Article 6.4.
The conference made decisions on a wide range of current issues facing the UNFCCC: reporting by various countries on GHG emissions and their activities in general, financial reporting, the work of the new fund for loss and damage, the Adaptation Fund and the Green Climate Fund, the work of the Standing Committee on Finance, the organizational activities of the mitigation work program, special issues of least developed countries, the gender action plan, the work of technology transfer centers, the organization of future UNFCCC sessions, administrative issues, etc. The decision-making process showed that countries are committed to cooperation and transparency (where the latter being a prerequisite for successful action, particularly in international cooperation under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, as well as for the growth of climate finance). Countries demonstrated their intention to reach consensus on complex issues, such as on the consideration of unilateral trade measures and finance under Article 9 of the Paris Agreement. This was clearly demonstrated by the approval of the COP agenda on the first day resulted from preliminary consultations. It is planned to continue discussing these complex issues in 2026. It is sad though, that consensus often leads to ‘silence’, that in turn results in failure to move forward.
The COP30 failures include issues related to fossil fuels and the preservation of tropical forests. The COP final documents make no mention of the transition away from fossil fuels, which was included in the list of actions by various countries (Transition Away from Fossil Fuel, TAFF) at COP28 when the first conclusions were drawn. In Belém, about 20 small countries announced that they would stop using fossil fuels in the near future, and TAFF was insisted upon by CAN and civil society together. However, the largest countries are focusing on time horizons of 30 to 70 years in their carbon neutrality trajectories, although shorter time frames are often publicly cited. In this situation, the “zero” consensus is not surprising, but it does not affect the global TAFF trend. At the close of COP 30, there were sharp statements from a number of countries, primarily Latin American ones, dissatisfied with the outcome. In response, the chair announced that he would prepare a roadmap for phasing out fossil fuels on his own behalf for COP 31.
We would also like to mention that in the СОР30 Draft Decision (Global Mutirão) announces of two volunteer initiatives of the СОР President: Global Implementation Accelerator, (GIA) and “Belém mission to 1.5C”, where the countries are urged to take active steps, but without giving any details or clear indication of refusing of fossil fuels. The inclusion of a 1.5°C Roadmap in Belém was advocated by a group of approximately 40 small island developing States, supported by the European Union. These countries emphasized their particular vulnerability to the most severe impacts of projected climate change scenarios. According to experts, the future development of this initiative will largely depend on the level of political leadership and engagement demonstrated by the Presidencies of COP30 and COP31.
The lack of progress on preserving tropical forests is arguably the main failure of COP30. The outcome documents make no reference to halting deforestation by 2030, despite the fact that this objective has been proposed repeatedly as a global goal. At the same time, ahead of the COP, at the Leaders’ Summit on 6–7 November, Brazil announced the launch of the Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF), intended to support the conservation of 1 billion hectares of forest across 70 developing countries. The initiative was endorsed by more than 50 countries, both developed and developing. The TFFF operates outside the UNFCCC framework and is based on an investment model: funds are invested in low-risk financial instruments unrelated to forests, and only the returns are used to finance forest conservation. The indicative payment level is set at USD 4 per hectare per year. Overall returns are modest, given that total committed investment amounts to just over USD 5 billion (with Brazil and Indonesia each contributing USD 1 billion, and Norway pledging USD 3 billion over ten years). Investment-based approaches to forest finance have previously been promoted by the United States and other developed countries. The TFFF now represents a practical example of such an approach, but it has attracted substantial criticism, including from Climate Action Network (CAN) and Indigenous Peoples’ organizations, which point to high risks and limited expected outcomes. Against this backdrop, the COP President announced plans to prepare, on behalf of COP31, a roadmap for ending tropical deforestation by 2030.
Future COPs. COP31 will take place in Turkey in November 2026, but the “President of the negotiations” will be a representative of Australia (the entire negotiating team preparing the documents will be Australian). This is the agreement between these countries, as reflected in a special agreement. Of course, the key issue will be the operationalization of the just transition mechanism. Probably, much attention will be paid to TAFF — ‘the beginning of the end of fossil fuels.’ Australia had previously intended to move forward on this issue. Australia also planned to raise the issue of seas and oceans to a higher level (currently it is the Annual Dialogue). More attention is expected to be paid to the needs of island states, primarily in terms of “loss and damage.”
The preparation to COP31 will be taking place in Bonne in June of 2026 at SB64. This is also where the dialog ‘devoted to mountain regions and climate change, in particular the need of the annual dialog…’ will be taking place.[4]
COP32 will be held in Addis Ababa, with a particular focus on adaptation issues, Africa, and least developed countries, which include Ethiopia.
COP33 is scheduled to take place in India, where it will be necessary to conduct a second review of the implementation of the Paris Agreement, go through all the negotiation topics with a view to strengthening them and putting them into practice.
[1] Decision 1/СМА.6 (2024) The new collective quantified goal on climate finance in paragraph 7 calls on all actors to jointly contribute to scaling up finance from all public and private sources to developing country Parties for climate change action to at least US$1.3 trillion per year by 2035. (https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/workstreams/baku-to-belem-roadmap-to-13t )
[2] This refers to the Climate Action Network region covering 11 countries. The recommendations in this review are more relevant to developing countries-recipients of climate finance (Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and Moldova), but are also applicable to developed countries (Belarus and Russia).
[3] В РКИК ООН механизмом называют институциональное образование с организационными и финансовыми функциями, например, Механизм чистого развития Киотского протокола, Финансовый Механизм РКИК, ст. 6.4 ПС тоже механизм (The Article 6.4 mechanism, also known as the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism).
[4] A summary report on the dialogue will be included in the overall report of the subsidiary bodies, which they will present at COP31 (see the ‘Mountains and Climate Change’ Draft Decision). The Mountain Countries Group (in particular, Kyrgyzstan) insisted on holding a special dialogue, supported by a number of developing countries, despite the opinion of the EU, Japan, and Switzerland that a special dialogue was unnecessary.
