CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK
Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia

Position on Nuclear Energy

of the Climate Civil Society Network in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia

Who We Are

CAN EECCA (Climate Action Network Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia) is the largest network of climate-focused civil society organisations in the Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia (EECCA) region. Established in 2008, our network is part of Climate Action Network International, a global climate network bringing together more than 2,000 civil society organisations across 130 countries.

Today, CAN EECCA comprises 66 civil society organisations from 11 countries in the region: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine.

Our mission is to support, strengthen and develop civil society organisations across the EECCA region to enhance their capacity to address the climate crisis and to contribute to the development and implementation of climate policies that advance climate justice.

Why We Developed This Position

Although the Climate Action Network (CAN), along with many governments, international organisations and financial institutions, has long recognised nuclear energy as a false solution to the climate crisis, debates regarding the role and expansion of this technology remain widespread across the EECCA region.

The purpose of this position paper is to compile the most up-to-date expert arguments concerning nuclear energy as a proposed response to the climate crisis. Our objective is not merely to provide a list of concerns, but to demonstrate, through concrete examples from EECCA countries, why the development of nuclear power plants (NPPs) is highly risky, economically disadvantageous and ineffective.

Any position regarding nuclear energy should be considered independently and must not be interpreted as support for oil or any other fossil fuel-based sources of energy.

The intensification of geopolitical conflicts and the reassessment of national energy strategies have strengthened the role of nuclear energy within Europe’s energy mix. Most recently, at the Nuclear Energy Summit held in Paris in March 2026, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen expressed concern over the declining share of nuclear power in Europe’s energy system and announced the European Union’s objective of deploying Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) across the EU by 2030, alongside the harmonisation of regulatory frameworks among Member States.

Political initiatives and renewed interest in nuclear energy had already gained momentum during the 28th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP28), when 25 countries, including Armenia, signed the Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy Capacity by 2050. To date, the Declaration has been endorsed by 32 countries. As members of CAN EECCA, we consider it essential to assess nuclear energy-related policy decisions through the lens of both safety and climate effectiveness.

Debates surrounding nuclear power development in the EECCA region have intensified in recent years. Plans currently exist to construct nuclear power plants in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, while Belarus continues to pursue the expansion of its nuclear energy sector. Public discussions surrounding these initiatives—including expert roundtables and media debates—are frequently characterised by misconceptions, inaccuracies and unsubstantiated claims.

Through this position paper, we aim to provide sufficient evidence to enable policymakers and the wider public to independently assess the reality that nuclear energy development in the EECCA region is already creating more challenges than solutions, including in the context of addressing the climate crisis.

Nuclear Energy and Climate

The potential of nuclear energy to address climate change is extremely limited, while its costs and risks to both people and the environment are substantial. Nuclear power cannot be considered a low-carbon solution commensurate with the scale and urgency of the climate challenge.

Although direct CO_2 emissions from the operation of nuclear power plants (NPPs) are relatively low, the full lifecycle of nuclear energy—including uranium mining and enrichment, plant construction, radioactive waste management, and decommissioning—results in a significant carbon footprint of approximately 66–146 g[1] CO_2e per kWh of electricity generated. According to a number of assessments, this figure can be comparable to that of natural gas-fired generation under unfavourable conditions, exceeds the lifecycle emissions of both onshore and offshore wind power[2], and is broadly comparable to those of solar photovoltaic (PV) generation[3]. Given that wind and solar technologies are not burdened by the additional environmental, economic and security challenges associated with nuclear power, the case for prioritising alternatives to nuclear energy is clear. The year 2024 was marked by unprecedented growth in solar power capacity and battery energy storage systems, driven by the continued and significant decline in their costs. As energy markets rapidly evolve, there is little evidence of a major resurgence in nuclear power construction, while the gradual decline of nuclear energy's share in global electricity generation continues[4].

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[1] Climate change and nuclear power. An analysis of nuclear greenhouse gas emissions, https://dont-nuke-the-climate.org/reports/climate-change-and-nuclear-power.pdf

[2] For onshore and offshore wind power respectively, the mean energy intensity value is 0.063 (±0.061 standard deviation on either side of the mean) and 0.055 (±0.037) kWh/kWh; mean GHG emissions are 20 (±14) and 16 (±9.6) g CO2e/kWh; and mean CO2 emissions 16 (±14) and 12 (±7.3) g/kWh. Source: Anders Arvesen, G. Hertwich. Assessing the life cycle environmental impacts of wind power: A review of present knowledge and research needs// Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews – October 2012, p. 5994-6006 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/234101386_Assessing_the_life_cycle_environmental_impacts_of_wind_power_A_review_of_present_knowledge_and_research_needs

[3] The median published life cycle GHG emissions estimate for c-Si PVs is **57** gCO2-eq/kWh. Source: David D. Hsu, Patrick O'Donoughue, Vasilis Fthenakis, Garvin A. Heath, Hyung Chul Kim, Pamala Sawyer, Jun-Ki Choi, and Damon E. Turney. Life Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Electricity Generation//Journal of industrial Ecology - March 2012. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1530-9290.2011.00439.x

[4]The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2025, https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/IMG/pdf/wnisr2025-v2.pdf

The pace of nuclear deployment is incompatible with the urgency of the climate crisis

The average construction time for a single nuclear reactor unit is between seven and nine years[5]. By contrast, wind and solar power installations of comparable capacity can typically be deployed within one to three years. Relying on nuclear energy as a climate solution means investing in infrastructure that will become operational only after the most critical window for climate action has largely passed.

Nuclear power underperforms renewable energy across key efficiency indicators

The levelised cost of electricity (LCOE) from new nuclear power plants is approximately three to five times higher[6] than that of onshore wind and solar generation. At the same time, the energy return on investment (EROI) of renewable energy technologies continues to improve as technologies advance, whereas the EROI of nuclear power has largely stagnated. Renewable energy can be deployed more quickly, at lower cost and with significantly lower risk.

In 2010, global electricity generation from nuclear power and from wind and solar energy combined amounted to approximately 2.7 trillion kWh and 0.3 trillion kWh respectively. By 2021, electricity generation from renewable sources had surpassed nuclear generation, reaching 2.9 trillion kWh compared to 2.7 trillion kWh from nuclear power[7].

Between 2015 and 2024, annual additions of solar photovoltaic capacity increased tenfold, reaching nearly 540 GW in 2024. Annual wind power additions rose from 65 GW in 2015 to approximately 115 GW in 2024. Over the same period, annual additions of nuclear generating capacity averaged only around 8 GW per year.

Every dollar invested in nuclear power is a dollar not invested in renewable energy

In a context of limited investment resources, nuclear projects compete directly with renewable energy for financing. The long payback periods associated with nuclear power lock capital into projects for decades, limiting the ability of energy systems to rapidly scale up clean energy generation.

Nuclear power is becoming increasingly operationally vulnerable in a changing climate

Nuclear power plants have demonstrated growing vulnerability to climate-related and weather-related risks. The risk of forced outages and unplanned shutdowns resulting from such events is increasing, with significant implications for the economics and reliability of nuclear energy. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),

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[5] The mean time from construction start to grid connection for the six reactors started up in 2021 was 7.1 years, comparable to 2020 (7.2 years), a clear improvement over the 9.9 years in 2019. In the case of the five units connected in the first half of 2022, the duration was nine years. The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2022, https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/IMG/pdf/wnisr2022-v3-lr.pdf (page 53)

[6] Lazard's Levelized Cost of Energy+ (LCOE+), https://www.lazard.com/media/2ozoovyg/lazards-lcoeplus-april-2023.pdf

[7] World Energy Outlook 2022, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/830fe099-5530-48f2-a7c1-11f35d510983/WorldEnergyOutlook2022.pdf (page 448)

climate change-related disruptions to nuclear power plant operations have increased worldwide in recent decades[8]. Nuclear facilities are particularly vulnerable to heatwaves, which can impair reactor cooling systems and necessitate power reductions or temporary shutdowns. In addition, nuclear reactors depend on reliable access to large volumes of cooling water, which may become unavailable during periods of drought. A report by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency concluded that excessively low or excessively high cooling-water temperatures were the most common natural and weather-related causes of nuclear plant shutdowns worldwide between 2004 and 2013. During that period, a total of 2,690 weather-related shutdown events were recorded[9]. As average global temperatures continue to rise, these challenges are expected to intensify. This is particularly relevant for many countries in the EECCA region and should be taken into account when making decisions regarding the future development of nuclear energy.

Additional Risks of Nuclear Energy

The risk of large-scale radiological accidents remains — and their economic consequences are catastrophic

Improvements in safety systems reduce the probability of severe accidents, but they do not eliminate it. The irreducible “residual risk” of major radiological accidents cannot be considered acceptable. While the probability of a large-scale disaster is low, the environmental and economic damage to the host country would be enormous. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident in 2011 cost Japan, according to various estimates, more than USD 200 billion. The Chernobyl disaster of 1986 continues to affect the health of populations and territories across several countries. According to information provided to the United Nations by the delegation of the Soviet Union in 1990, contamination affected 2,224 settlements with a total population of 824,000 people. A total of 116,000 people were evacuated, 144,000 hectares of agricultural land and 492,000 hectares of forest were withdrawn from use[10]. A single major accident can cause damage that is disproportionate to the benefits of decades of plant operation.

It is highly likely that, in the event of a disaster, radioactive contamination would spread across neighbouring countries, potentially triggering international conflicts. Accidents and incidents at other elements of the nuclear infrastructure (uranium mining and enrichment facilities, fuel fabrication plants, and radioactive waste management sites) cannot be excluded.

The entire nuclear fuel cycle is a source of radiation exposure to populations and entails significant economic costs for mitigating environmental risks.

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[8] Climate Change 2022. Mitigation of Climate Change. Working Group III contribution to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg3/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGIII_Full_Report.pdf (page 6-75).

[9] NEA. Climate Change: Assessment of the Vulnerability of Nuclear Power Plants and Approaches for their Adaptation, 2021.
https://www.oecd-nea.org/jcms/pl_61802/climate-change-assessment-of-the-vulnerability-of-nuclear-power-plants-and-approaches-for-their-adaptation?details=true (page. 51)

[10] Information on the economic and social consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant accident, presented by the delegations of the USSR, the Byelorussian SSR, and the Ukrainian SSR. (Информация об экономических и социальных последствиях аварии на Чернобыльской АЭС, представленная делегациями СССР, БССР и УССР) https://www.un.org/ru/events/chernobyl/docs/45-342.pdf

Risks are posed not only by nuclear power plants themselves, but also by uranium mines, enrichment facilities, nuclear fuel reprocessing plants, and waste storage sites. Populations living in proximity to these facilities are exposed to chronic radiation exposure that is poorly monitored and often inadequately documented. Examples of such risks include waste from uranium mining and processing in Russia[11], Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, where more than 800 million tonnes of waste from uranium extraction and processing have accumulated[12]. To support environmental remediation at seven priority sites in Central Asia, the Strategic Master Plan for Environmental Remediation of Uranium Legacy Sites (SMP) was developed by the IAEA Coordination Group for Uranium Legacy Sites (CGULS) Secretariat, with support from international organisations and experts from Central Asian countries and other stakeholders, covering the period 2025–2030. The total estimated cost of the Environmental Remediation Programme (ERA) currently amounts to EUR 113 million[13].

The development of nuclear technologies is inseparable from the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation

Uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing technologies required for civilian nuclear energy are the same technologies used to produce weapons-grade materials. The expansion of countries possessing a full nuclear fuel cycle objectively increases the risk of nuclear proliferation, regardless of declared intentions. Despite international efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, India, Pakistan, the DPRK, and possibly Israel have developed and tested nuclear explosive devices. The proliferation of nuclear weapons can seriously destabilise the international security environment and increase the risk of nuclear weapon use.

The problem of long-term disposal of radioactive waste remains unresolved

No country in the world has yet commissioned a permanent deep geological repository for high-level radioactive waste. At the same time, some of this waste remains hazardous for hundreds of thousands of years. Assuming responsibility for this obligation towards hundreds of future generations — without any guarantee of its fulfilment — is ethically unacceptable.

Decommissioning of nuclear power plants is a highly complex and costly process that will be passed on to future generations

By 2026, more than 220 commercial, experimental, or prototype power reactors, as well as more than 500 research reactors, had been permanently shut down. Only around 25 reactors have been fully dismantled. For US reactors, total decommissioning costs are estimated to range from USD 544 million to 821 million. For units above 1,100 MW, costs have ranged from USD 0.46 to 0.73 million per MW, while for units with roughly half that capacity, costs range from USD 1.07 to 1.22 million per MW. For the Loviisa nuclear power

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[11] Uranium Found in Soil (Уран нашли на земле), https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4434549

[12] Uranium Tailings in Central Asia: Local Problems, Regional Impacts, Global Solutions. Outcomes of the CARNet Regional Online Discussion Network (Урановые хвостохранилища в Центральной Азии: местные проблемы, региональные последствия, глобальное решение. Результаты региональной электронной дискуссии Сети CARNet) https://www.caa-network.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/UraniumTailings.pdf

[13] Strategic Master Plan for Environmental Remediation of Uranium Legacy Sites in Central Asia 2025—2030, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/cguls_smp-3.pdf

plant in Finland (2 × 502 MW), the estimated cost is EUR 326 million. For a 1,000 MW PWR plant in Switzerland, the detailed estimate amounts to CHF 663 million (EUR 617 million). In Slovakia, a detailed study found that the total cost of decommissioning the Bohunice V1 nuclear power plant (2 × 440 MW) and dismantling it by 2025 would reach EUR 1.14 billion[14].

Large nuclear power units are incompatible with the power systems of small states

A standard nuclear power unit with a capacity of 1,000–1,600 MW represents a significant share of the total installed capacity of small and medium-sized power systems. Its sudden shutdown creates uncontrolled load fluctuations that threaten the stability of the entire grid. A telling example is Belarus, where a 1.2 GW unit was integrated into a system with a total capacity of around 11 GW, with a high share of combined heat and power (CHP) plants. Nuclear generation displaced CHP plants from baseload operation, but they could not be fully decommissioned as they simultaneously provide heat. As a result, during winter nights CHP plants were forced to operate in an inefficient mode, while additional peak and reserve capacity exceeding 800 MW had to be built to compensate for imbalances, and part of the CHP fleet was converted to electric boilers — all of which resulted in significant additional costs that were not originally accounted for in the project. Similar constraints are characteristic of most countries in the EECCA region, where existing power systems are not designed to integrate generating units of such scale without substantial infrastructure modernisation and significant financial investment.

Nuclear energy is economically unviable without large-scale public subsidies

Private investors consistently avoid investment in new nuclear power plants due to excessively long implementation timelines, high construction cost overrun risks, and low predictability of returns. This is clearly reflected in the figures: according to the World Nuclear Industry Status Report, investment decisions in reactor projects in 2019 amounted to around USD 31 billion for 5.8 GW, which is less than one quarter of investments in wind or solar energy individually[15]. In 2021, around USD 24 billion was committed to 8.8 GW of nuclear capacity — approximately 7% of total investments in renewable energy[16]. The cost of nuclear electricity is increasing, while that of renewables continues to decline. The rapid expansion of solar power, battery storage systems, and power electronics is accelerating the transition towards more flexible and decentralised energy systems. Against this backdrop, nuclear energy faces increasing challenges in integration and competitiveness, particularly given the continued reduction in energy storage costs, which fell by around 40% in 2024[17]. In the United States, unsubsidised average costs of solar electricity generation declined by 90% between 2009 and 2021, and wind by 72%, while the cost of nuclear power increased

[14] Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities, https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-waste/decommissioning-nuclear-facilities#decommissioning-experience

[15] The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2020, https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/IMG/pdf/wnisr2020-v2_lr.pdf (page 267)

[16] The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2022. https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/IMG/pdf/wnisr2022-v3-lr.pdf (page 278).

[17] The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2025 https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/IMG/pdf/wnisr2025-v2.pdf (page 20)

by 36%[18]. At the same time, the real cost of nuclear energy is systematically underestimated, as a significant share of expenses is borne by public budgets through construction subsidies, state-backed nuclear liability insurance, and regulated tariffs.

A separate category of hidden costs is the management of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and radioactive waste, which may amount to tens of billions of euros per reactor over its full lifecycle. Notably, in Belarus — already operating a nuclear power plant — the full lifecycle cost of spent nuclear fuel management has still not been officially calculated. If all these costs were reflected in the real price of nuclear electricity, its economic non-competitiveness would become evident.

Nuclear power plants and nuclear infrastructure are vulnerable targets in conditions of armed conflict and terrorism

Nuclear power plants and other elements of the nuclear fuel cycle are highly vulnerable both to terrorist attacks and to military action. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has turned the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the largest in Europe, into a site of ongoing nuclear risk. Repeated shelling of the plant's territory, seizure of the facility by armed forces, and disconnection from external power supply have brought the world to the brink of a radiological disaster. This unprecedented experience clearly demonstrates that a nuclear power plant in a conflict zone becomes an instrument of nuclear blackmail. Similar risks emerged during the armed conflict in Iran in relation to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant.

Risks Associated with Nuclear Energy in the EECCA Region

Lack of transparency in the nuclear sector makes independent oversight impossible

In many EECCA countries, data on the condition of nuclear facilities, radiation levels, and incidents are classified or systematically underreported. The absence of an independent regulator and effective mechanisms for public participation means that populations bear risks about which they are not informed. The lack of transparency in nuclear power plant operations raises serious concerns regarding the safety of the Belarusian Nuclear Power Plant, located 18 km from the town of Astravets and 40 km from Vilnius. In March 2023, Lithuanian intelligence stated that Rosatom and the Belarusian authorities had concealed information about incidents at the reactor units[19]. Operational issues at the plant are further evidenced by numerous "planned" shutdowns of the reactors during its operation.

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[18] The annual Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE) analysis for the U.S. last updated by Lazard, one of the oldest banks in the world, in October 2021,1074 suggests that unsubsidized average electricity generating costs declined on average between 2009 and 2021 in the case of solar PV (crystalline, utility-scale) from US$359 to US$36 per MWh, a fall of 90 percent, and for wind from US$135 to US$38 per MWh (a 72 percent fall), while nuclear power costs went up from US$123 to US$167 per MWh, an increase of 36 percent (see Figure 52). The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2022.

[19] Intelligence: Belarus Concealed Incidents at the Astravets Nuclear Power Plant in 2022 (Разведка: Беларусь скрыла инциденты, которые произошли на Островецкой АЭС в 2022 году), https://www.delfi.lt/ru/news/politics/razvedka-belarus-skryla-incidenty-kotorye-proizoshli-na-ostroveckoy-aes-v-2022-godu-92753271

Dependence on a narrow group of technology providers creates long-term geopolitical vulnerability

Countries constructing nuclear power plants become subject to a complex form of dependency: on Russian nuclear fuel (which, as a rule, has no alternative suppliers during the initial years of operation), on Russian specialists for maintenance, and on Russian spare parts and software. Russia uses this dependency as an instrument of political leverage — a reality clearly demonstrated by the experience of Ukraine, Bulgaria, and other countries in the region. The events of 2022 made this vulnerability evident to the international community.

Corruption risks in nuclear power plant construction in the region are systemic and well documented

Large-scale, long-term infrastructure projects with opaque financing structures, intergovernmental credit schemes, and a single dominant contractor create highly favourable conditions for corruption. Several Rosatom-led projects in the region have been accompanied by scandals involving non-transparent contractual arrangements and rising debt burdens on national budgets.

The Chernobyl disaster has left enduring scars in the region's historical memory — and unresolved practical challenges

The accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant on 26 April 1986 was a tragedy for the entire EECCA region. The national identity of countries such as Belarus and Ukraine has been shaped in part by the collective reflection on this disaster, which affected the lives of hundreds of thousands of people, led to radioactive contamination of vast territories including almost the entire Polesia region, and became a symbol of the struggle for environmental rights and access to environmental information.

The consequences of Chernobyl are still felt in Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, and other countries: contaminated territories, elevated rates of illness among liquidators and populations of exclusion zones, and unresolved social obligations towards affected communities. The Soviet nuclear legacy — spent nuclear fuel storage sites, closed cities, contaminated sites — still lacks both technical and financial resolution in many countries of the region. Uranium mining sites in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are one such example. Ignoring this historical legacy in the promotion of new nuclear projects is politically and ethically unacceptable.

In addition, nuclear safety in the EECCA region is affected by unfavourable seismic and climatic conditions in several countries, as well as by the age of operating nuclear power units (most of which were constructed in the 1970s–1980s during the Soviet period). These factors increase the risk of accidents and make nuclear energy in the EECCA region unsafe.

Our Vision for the Energy Transition

In the presence of faster, cheaper, and safer alternatives, the choice in favour of nuclear power plants becomes irrational. In order to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement, decarbonisation of the energy sector in the EECCA region must be pursued through reduced energy consumption, improved energy efficiency, and a just transition, primarily towards decentralised solar and wind energy as the most economically efficient options[20].

Accordingly, we consider it necessary to abandon new nuclear energy projects as well as fossil fuel projects, including their direct and indirect subsidies.

EECCA countries must reorient financing and other forms of support for the energy transition towards renewable energy, and strengthen international cooperation, knowledge exchange, and technology transfer in the fields of renewable energy and energy efficiency.

The combination of the arguments presented leads us to a clear conclusion: nuclear energy is neither a necessary nor a desirable component of the energy transition in the EECCA region.

The climate crisis demands rapid, scalable, and economically accessible solutions. Renewable energy — solar, wind, and geothermal, combined with energy storage systems, improved energy efficiency, and grid modernisation — meets these requirements. Nuclear energy does not. It is too expensive, too slow, too dangerous, and too deeply embedded in a logic of monopoly dependency from which the region seeks to free itself.

We advocate for an energy transition based on the following principles:

Speed and proportionality. Energy solutions must be deployed within timeframes consistent with climate targets. Priority should be given to technologies with short investment cycles.

Energy sovereignty. Countries in the region should build energy systems based on local renewable resources, rather than reproducing dependency on external monopolistic suppliers of technology and fuel.

Safety and transparency. Energy policy must be shaped with meaningful public participation, open data, and independent regulation — not under the conditions of opacity characteristic of the nuclear sector.

Just transition. Vulnerable communities — including those already affected by the nuclear legacy of the Soviet era and those living near operating facilities within the nuclear fuel cycle — must be at the centre of energy transition policies, not its victims.

Responsibility towards future generations. We are not entitled to leave unresolved problems of radioactive waste and a deteriorating nuclear infrastructure to future generations in the hope that they will find solutions that we have not.

CAN EECCA is convinced: a safe, affordable, and sovereign energy future for the region is possible — and it will be renewable.

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[20] 2023: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, https://report.ipcc.ch/ar6syr/pdf/IPCC_AR6_SYR_SPM.pdf